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POLICY ANALYSIS: 
U.S. Policy Toward Strategic Asia 
Since September 11: Expanding Power 
or Promoting Values?* 
VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 marked a turning point 
in the United States' relationships with the rest of the world, especially 
Strategic Asia1-the entire eastern half of the Eurasian landmass and the 
arc of offshore islands in the Western Pacific. Notwithstanding the human 
VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG (~~li.iE) is Associate Professor of Political Science, University 
of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia, U.S.A. His areas of specialization are Asian politics, in-
ternational relations, and East Asian-Latin American comparative development. His pub-
lications can be found in such scholarly journals as Pacific Affairs, Issues & Studies, Asian 
Affairs, American Asian Review, and Pacific Focus, and book chapters. He can be reached 
at <vwang@richmond.edu>. 
*This article is a shortened revised version of the papers presented at the ISA/CEEISA Con-
ference, Budapest, Hungary, June 25-28, 2003, and the International Conference, "Anti-
Terrorism War, SARS, and the Asia-Pacific Security Environment," St. John's University, 
Jamaica, New York, November 1-2, 2003. Comments by Prof. Robert Donaldson, Robert 
Sutter, Wen-cheng Lin, and Daniel Unger are acknowledged. 
©Institute oflntemational Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan (ROC). 
1This term was coined by Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg for their annual projects 
launched in 2002. Their concept envisages an area centered around China and consisting 
of four distinct sub-regions arrayed clockwise around it: Central Asia, Northeast Asia, 
Southeast Asia and the islands of Oceania, and the South Asian sub-continent. They 
claim that the formation of "Strategic Asia" is the result of a confluence of geopolitical, 
technological, economic, and ideational trends. See Aaron L. Friedberg, "Introduction," 
in Strategic Asia 200I -02: Power and Purpose, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Fried-
berg (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002), 1-25. 
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tragedy, 911 constituted a major strategic event. 2 The post-911 diplomacy 
and war on terrorism caused the "tectonic plates" of Strategic Asia to shift, 
raising serious questions about the role of the United States in this vital 
region. 
The fundamental effects of911 have been to accentuate the long-term 
shift of emphasis in U.S. strategy and force posture away from Europe 
and toward Asia. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Defense 
Department's major high-level strategic planning document (completed 
before September 11, 2001 but released right after September 11 ), noted 
that Asia was gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale 
military competition. The QDR also hinted "a military competitor with a 
formidable resource base" would emerge in the East Asian littoraV which 
many construed to mean China. 
However, as many U.S. officials have opined, "everything has 
changed" after September 11: Washington's need to cultivate cooperation 
in the global war against terrorism has contributed to improvements in 
great-power relations. The complex and unfolding ramifications of the 
U.S.-led war on terror for Strategic Asia can be summarized as: broadening 
U.S. presence in and engagement with key parts of Strategic Asia; strength-
ening America's relationships with its strategic partners, both formal allies 
and quasi-allied democracies; and intensifYing the competitive aspects of 
U.S. relations with those countries that Washington has long regarded with 
suspicion. 
This paper examines the change and continuity of U.S. policy toward 
Strategic Asia after September 11 and discusses the impact of September 
11 on regional security trends. The main arguments are: (1) the anti-terror 
war codenamed Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)-which successfully 
destroyed the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, dislodged the Taliban re-
2Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, "Introduction," in Strategic Asia 2002-03: Asian 
Aftershocks, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, with Michael Willis (Seattle: 
The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), 3. 
3Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Depart-
ment of Defense, September 30, 2001), 4. 
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gime that provided Al-Qaeda with sanctuary in Afghanistan, and then 
turned to a "second front" in Southeast Asia-has advanced U.S. power 
and standing in Strategic Asia;4 (2) OEF constitutes a major ingredient 
in the emerging Bush Doctrine;5 (3) while the doctrine exemplified by OEF 
appears to follow realist premises, by connecting the destruction of terror-
ism and the expansion of freedom, the result of the Bush Doctrine is, para-
doxically, a Wilsonian brand of internationalism that combines American 
power and principles;6 and (4) American policy since OEF should guard 
against such pitfalls as over-reliance on military engagement, backlash 
against American policies, and setbacks in the realm of human rights. 
"Everything Has Changed"? 
Many have used the phrase "everything has changed" to describe ad-
justments in American domestic and foreign policies after September 11. 
Before the attacks, America's focus in the Asia-Pacific region was both to 
40peration Enduring Freedom began its combat operations in Afghanistan on October 7, 
2001. Two months later the last major city-Kandahar-was captured by the coalition, 
which consisted of ninety countries supporting the global war on terrorism (twenty-seven of 
them contributed forces in Afghanistan). The coalition continues to pursue terrorists 
through financial, diplomatic, legal, and military means. For more information, see Oper-
ation Enduring Freedom: One Year of Accomplishments, http://www.hitehouse.gov/infocus/ 
defense/enduringfreedom.html. 
5The main ideas of the Bush Doctrine are articulated in several documents: the QDR; the 
2002 State of the Union Address, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/ 
20020129-ll.html; Bush's remarks at West Point Graduation (June 2002), http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/2002060 l-3.html; The National Security Strategy 
of the United States of America (September 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf; 
and Bush's talk to the American Enterprise Institute (February 26, 2003), http://www.white-
house.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-ll.html. 
6Thomas Donnelly, a commentator at the conservative think tank, the American Enterprise 
Institute, claims that the National Security Strategy foresaw an opportunity to exercise a 
"distinctly American internationalism" that reflects the "union of our values and our national 
interests." Donnelly also argues that President Bush's speech at the AEI about liberating and 
remaking Iraq was "imbued with liberal political principles that the founders would recog-
nize as essentially the same as their own." "Coming from Clinton's mouth, these wo:ds 
would elaborate ... very good reasons for avoiding a war. For ... Bush, these were fightmg 
words." See "The Meaning of Operation Iraqi Freedom," posted May 21,2003, http://www 
.aei.org/include/pub_print.asp? pubiD=17229 (accessed May 22, 2003). 
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help the regional economy in its recovery from the 1997-99 financial crisis 
and to deal with such security challenges as China's growing stature, the 
problem of weapons proliferation, and-more fundamentally-America's 
continued predominance in the region. 
After September 11, non-allies-including Pakistan and China-
capitalized on the U.S.-led war on terror to improve their relationships with 
the United States that had frayed since the end of the Cold War. Countries 
like India, concerned that their nemeses might be courted by Washington in 
the anti-terror war, also eagerly offered help to the United States in order to 
maintain a balance in Washington's preferences. Suddenly the world seem-
ed united around the United States over the cause of anti-terrorism. This 
solidarity may have been a result of the appalling nature of the attacks that 
helped forge a new coalition against terrorism; alternatively, the desire to 
appease the United States might have been what caused unsavory countries 
to "rally around the flag." The great-power consensus that had withered 
after the end of the Cold War was for a while "back in place in expanded 
form: the U.S., the European Union, Russia, China, and Japan are all on the 
same side now-at least on the issue of terrorism. "7 
In return, cooperation with the United States resulted in huge benefits 
for America's new partners. The Bush administration lifted the sanctions 
that Washington had imposed on Pakistan and India since their nuclear tests 
in 1998. Due to their strategic importance to OEF, military aid was given 
to the five Central Asian states, all with poor human rights records-an es-
pecially controversial move. The Federation of American Scientists points 
out that in the first year since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration 
had requested US$3.8 billion in security assistance and related aid for 
sixty-seven countries allegedly linked in some way to the U.S.-led war on 
terrorism. 8 
7John Lewis Gaddis, "And Now This: Lessons from the Old Era for the New One," in The 
Age of Terror: America and the World After September ll, ed. Strobe Talbott and Nayan 
Chanda (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 18-19. 
8Federation of American Scientists, Arms Sales Monitor, no. 48 (August 2002): I. 
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Pacific Rim: The Second Front? 
After swiftly overthrowing the Taliban regime and degrading al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan, OEF turned its attention to the Asia-Pacific region. 
Southeast Asia was called "the second front. "9 Here OEF met with the di-
minishing returns of a military approach, a vanishing diplomatic honey-
moon, and the complex political roots of terrorism in the region. 
The Asia-Pacific region is playing a growing role in both America's 
foreign policy goals in general and the war on terrorism in particular. 
Global wealth and military power are increasingly concentrated in the 
Asia-Pacific. With Europe at ease, all the major flashpoints where great-
power rivalry may intersect-the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the 
South China Sea, and India-Pakistan over Kashmir-are located in this re-
gion. The QDR thus advocated a "paradigm shift in force planning" in or-
der to better accommodate anticipated needs in the Asia-Pacific. Beneath 
the surface calm extant in much of the region today, there exist deep cleav-
ages and enduring disputes that could undermine peace. The anti-terror 
campaign has not altered any "strategic fundamentals" of these fissures. 
Strategically East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East are linked, 
as the anti-terror campaign well demonstrates. Even before September 11, 
many analysts had warned that the Pacific Rim would become the next 
battleground of global terrorism-and yet the region is the least prepared 
region (save Africa) to combat extremists. A mix of socioeconomic 
marginalization, loosening political controls, and vanishing borders has 
created a worrisome situation in Asia. Given Asia's increasingly porous 
borders and rapidly improving communications, transport, and information 
infrastructure, extremists now are able to develop closer political and finan-
cial links with militants, arms suppliers, drug dealers, and other shadowy 
forces in South Asia and the Middle East. 
Southeast Asia is home to the largest Muslim nation (Indonesia) and 
9John Gershman "Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?" Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July/ 
August 2002): 60-74; and Joshua Kurlantzick, "Fear Moves East: Targets the Pacific 
Rim," The Washington Quarterly 24, no. I (Winter 2001): 19-29. 
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two other countries with groups seeking to establish fundamentalist Islamic 
theocracies (the Philippines and Malaysia). The region is an important 
front in the anti-terror war, with a large number of established Muslim fun-
damentalist groups sympathetic to Osama bin Laden. Home to radical 
Islamic groups such as the Jemmah Islamiah, Abu Sayyaf, and the Kumpu-
lan Mujahideen Malaysia, Southeast Asia has emerged as a new home base 
for international terrorist networks. 
U.S. Turns Toward Strategic Asia 
The above facts explain why the United States has quickly turned its 
attention to the region after winning in Afghanistan. Although cooperation 
has extended to criminal justice, money laundering, and immigration con-
trol, the most important instrument has been military cooperation. 
Since September 11, the United States has been rapidly expanding 
military ties with Asian nations. Washington has increased military co-
operation with Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia in order to 
pursue members of al-Qaeda. In January 2002, the Bush administration 
sent 660 U.S. military "advisers" to the Philippines; these specialists were 
deployed to the south of the archipelago to fight Muslim extremists of 
the Abu Sayyaf, whose top lieutenants had ties with al-Qaeda. The U.S. 
Congress also passed a bill to establish counterterrorism training programs 
for Southeast Asian armies. 1° Fighting the Indonesia-based al-Qaeda-
linked terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah emerged in 2003 as a top priority 
for U.S. forces in Asia. 
The United States has maintained a military presence in Asia since 
the Cold War. The Clinton administration began using the military as a 
vehicle for engaging and managing relations with an increasing number 
of countries. Countries with ties to the U.S. military in tum gain such 
10Sally Buzbee, "Counterterrorism Moves to Southeast Asia," Associated Press, in The 
Washington Times, February 18, 2002. 
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valuable help as military training or access to equipment. 
As a result of OEF, the United States gained unprecedented access to 
bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Pakistani President Gen. 
Pervez Musharraf also allowed U.S. troops access to bases in Pakistan for 
humanitarian and logistic purposes.ll 
All these initiatives have served to improve America's diplomatic and 
strategic positions in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States has made 
military inroads into Central Asia for the first time, and American troops 
are making a return to Southeast Asia, a region that they vacated after the 
Vietnam War in the 1970s. These gains came, however, at the expense of 
tradeoffs, such as America's declining diplomatic capital (especially when 
President George W. Bush decided to attack Iraq) and the potential for ex-
acerbating great-power rivalry. The U.S. relationship with China is illus-
trative. 
China: Tactical Gains, Strategic Losses 
George W. Bush labeled China "a competitor" during his campaigns. 
After he became President, the U.S.-China relationship steadily deterio-
rated, reaching a nadir over the EP-3 spy plane incident in April200 1. Sep-
tember 11 offered a significant opportunity to reduce tensions and increase 
cooperation between these two uneasy great powers. 
China's priority in modernization, desire to become a respected great 
power, and problem of fighting its own terrorist challenges are among the 
most important factors that have contributed to China's cooperative be-
havior. China's role in arranging a six-party talk over North Korea also 
earned America's good will. 12 China realizes that the success of its mod-
11 For a convincing thesis on how September II transfo.rmed U.S. polic~ in South.west Asia, 
predicated on a rediscovered relationship with Pakistan as a frontline state m the war 
against terror, see Samina Ahmed, "The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia: 
September II and Beyond," International Security 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001102): 79-93. 
12For more on China's new and more mature diplomacy, see EvanS. Medeiros and M. Taylor 
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ernization goals depends on its relationship with the United States. Even 
the staunchest Chinese nationalists understand the wisdom of avoiding a 
premature showdown with the United States. 
However, the geopolitical realignment and U.S. gains in the aftermath 
of September II also unsettle China. Beijing fears that the U.S. military 
presence in Southwest Asia may become a permanent fixture in China's 
strategic backyard. The area where the strategic landscape could change 
happens to border China's largest province, Xinjiang (#IT~), which makes 
up one-sixth of China's landmass and is home to restless Muslim popu-
lations and potential oil reserves. The race by several Central Asian repub-
lics to court favor with the United States has weakened China's influence 
in Central Asia and undermined the six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganization (SCO), which China painstakingly put together in 2000 in order 
mainly to cut off the Islamic militants in Xinjiang. 
On China's southwestern front, the United States now commands 
Pakistan's complete cooperation. China had been Pakistan's staunchest ally 
and arms supplier. Also disturbing is America's simultaneous upgrading of 
relations with India, Pakistan's sworn enemy who often considers China as 
its major security threat. 
On the eastern front, Japan's alliance with the United States has also 
been strengthened. President Bush is willing to talk tough against North 
Korea, China's ally, on behalf of South Korea. While cooperating with 
China, the United States has stood its ground regarding Taiwan. The 
United States has reinvigorated military and other relationships with the 
major members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
The U.S.-Australian alliance, moreover, is stronger than ever. 
U.S.-Russian relations have also greatly improved. President Putin 
helped the United States gain access to Central Asian bases. He stopped 
opposing NATO's expansion, U.S. missile defense, and the Bush adminis-
tration's withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. 
Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (November/December 2003): 
22-35. 
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The better U.S.-Russian relationship offset the Sino-Russian relationship, 
which Beijing has long cultivated to counterbalance American "hegemo-
nism." 
However, China has also reaped many gains. The anti-terror cooper-
ation halted decline in U.S.-China ties. President Bush twice traveled to 
China after 911. In August 2002, the United States gave China a major 
diplomatic victory: U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage an-
nounced in China that the United States would place on the American terror 
list the little-known Xinjiang-based Uighur ( Mi -fr f;lij' ~)Muslim group, the 
East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which had sought an inde-
pendent Muslim state and attacked American diplomats. 
Despite its eagerness to improve ties with the United States, China 
has shown ambivalence toward the U.S.-led anti-terror war. Beijing cher-
ishes the opportunity presented by this war to restore the strategic glue in 
the bilateral relationship-a bond that had been missing since the end of the 
Cold War. Strong anti-American elements exist in China today, however, 
obstructing a total accommodation with the United States. China fears be-
ing virtually encircled as a result of the series of reinvigorated relationships 
that Washington has fostered with China's neighbors. China fears that in 
the long term, the war may consolidate America's preeminent position in 
the Asia-Pacific region at the expense of China's power and aspirations. 
China's attitudes reveal that the country is not a crucial partner to the 
United States in the anti-terror war. If nations are ranked in a series of con-
centric circles in terms of both their importance to the United States in the 
war effort and the degree of congruence of their interests with America's, 
China is not located in the core, which includes America's staunchest tra-
ditional allies like NATO and Japan; nor does it belong in the second 
ring, which now includes such nations as Pakistan whose cooperation 
Washington eagerly seeks. China is probably somewhere in the third or 
fourth circle-a sphere for those countries whose cooperation is desirable 
but not essential from the U.S. standpoint. 
In sum, the atmosphere in U.S.-China relations has improved and 
there have also been small gains on certain issues. On those long-standing 
issues dividing the two countries-such as weapons proliferation, Taiwan, 
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human rights, and religious persecutions, the post-911 cooperation has 
not, however, led to any substantive progress. The U.S.-China relation-
ship since September 11, to use David Lampton's words, resembles "small 
mercies." 13 
U.S. Objectives and Strategy in Post-911 Asia 
America's strategies in post-911 Asia are best understood in light of 
the goals set in the National Security Strategy (NSS): "We will defend the 
peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by 
building good relations among great powers. We will extend the peace by 
encouraging free and open societies on every continent." 14 
John Lewis Gaddis points out three innovations in the NSS: (1) equa-
tion of terrorists with tyrants as sources of danger; (2) emphasis on cooper-
ation among the great powers; and (3) removing the causes of terrorism 
and tyranny. 15 Operationalizing these goals in the Asia-Pacific includes 
the following three steps. First, in order to formulate a strategy aimed at a 
pivotal long-term objective-preventing a worsening of the security situ-
ation in Asia, the United States must preclude the rise of a regional or con-
tinental hegemon. This step is necessary in order to prevent the United 
States from being denied economic, political, and military access to an im-
portant part of the globe, and to prevent a concentration of resources that 
could support a global challenge to the United States on the order of that 
posed by the former Soviet Union. 16 Thus, the United States should main-
tain a balance of power in Asia favorable to U.S. interests. The NSS iden-
tifies terrorism and tyranny as threats to human freedom-and removing 
13David M. Lampton, "Small Mercies: China and America After 9/11," The National 
Interest, Winter2001, 106-13. 
14The National Security Strategy (cited in note 5 above). 
15John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," Foreign Policy, November-
December 2002, 50-57. 
16Zalmay Khalilzad et a!., The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and 
Force Posture (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), 43. 
178 December 2003 
Policy Analyses 
them requires exercise of power. The strategy thus manages to reinterpret 
America's exercise of power as a struggle for freedom: "We seek ... to 
create a balance of power that favors human freedom." 17 This is the NSS's 
first innovation. 
Second, although the NSS stresses the importance of having all great 
powers "on the same side" united by common dangers of terrorist violence 
and chaos, the United States strives to tum this common interest in pro-
moting global security into a union of common values. President Bush sees 
engagement with China and Russia as a means to achieve a goal that ad-
vances U.S. values and interests: "America will encourage the advance-
ment of democracy and economic openness in both nations, because these 
are the best foundations for domestic stability and intemational order." 18 
The NSS's second innovation, capitalizing on the great-power cooperation 
in fighting terror, is aimed at promoting democracy. 
The NSS's third innovation calls for removal of roots of terrorism and 
tyranny. "The events of September 11, 2001 taught us that weak states, like 
Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong 
states." The report asserts, "Poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can 
make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within 
their borders." The United States will actively work to bring "the hope of 
democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every comer of the 
world." 19 
In other words, Bush's realist strategies for Asia represent steps to 
finish the idealist goals first undertaken by President Woodrow Wilson-to 
make the world safe for democracy. To accomplish these goals, the United 
States should seek to maintain stability in the region by actively shaping 
developments, managing Asia's ongoing transformation, and deterring the 
use of force against U.S. allies lest U.S. credibility in the region suffer. 
Aaron Friedberg identifies the three central themes in the Bush ad-
ministration's approach toward Asia: (1) a clear emphasis on maintaining a 
17The National Security Strategy (cited in note 5 above). 
18Ibid. 
19Ibid. 
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favorable Asian balance of power; (2) a strong preference for cooperating 
with other democracies; and (3) a decided inclination toward wariness in 
dealing with non-democratic regimes. Finding that U.S. policies toward 
Asia since September 11 have combined elements of "engagement" and 
"containment," he holds that the approach has succeeded in (1) broadening 
U.S. presence in and engagement with key actors of Strategic Asia (Paki-
stan and Central Asia); (2) strengthening America's relationships with its 
primary strategic partners-both formal allies (Japan, South Korea, and 
Australia) and quasi-allied democracies (India and Taiwan); and (3) inten-
sifying the competitive aspects ofU.S. relations with those countries that it 
has long regarded with suspicion (North Korea and China).20 This strategy 
has achieved notable success. However, OEF is now entering into more 
difficult terrain. 
Whither the Anti-Terror War 
The next phase of the anti-terror campaign will encounter several 
thorny problems. The first issue regards what comes next and whether or 
not there is an end game. President Bush's decision to attack Iraq in March 
2003 cost him considerable diplomatic capital and has sowed the seeds of 
dissension in the coalition. 
The second is the nettlesome issue of weapons proliferation. China 
and Pakistan, both enlisted by Washington to help combat terrorism, have 
had close military relationships with one or more members of Bush's "axis 
of evil." However, the most urgent challenge is North Korea's recently 
restarted nuclear programs-a move which is in apparent violation of the 
1994 Agreed Framework. Bush has sought to resolve this challenge 
through diplomatic rather than military means.21 
2
°For more details on these categories, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "United States," in Ellings 
and Friedberg, Strategic Asia 2002-03, 30-44. 
21 See Nicholas N. Eberstadt, "Korea," in Ellings and Friedberg, Strategic Asia 2002-03, 
131-82; James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, "How to Deal with North Korea," Foreign 
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A third challenge is the legitimate concern expressed by many in the 
human rights community that the anti-terror war may undermine the cause 
of human rights. Some governments are capitalizing on the anti-terror war 
in order to suppress domestic dissidents or minority groups. Russia's war 
in Chechnya and China's crackdown in Xinjiang are two such examples. 
Human rights watchdog groups have sounded concern that the war on ter-
rorism has set back human rights and civil liberties in many countries.22 
Some are concerned that the United States is cozying up to unlikely new 
bedmates as it forms a coalition to battle terrorism, but such actions could 
backfire down the line and create new instability. 
A final issue concerns what would happen to the current great-power 
concert after the war on terror is over. September 11 offered a catalyst for 
improved U.S.-China relations. Although the Bush administration seems 
satisfied for the time being with its relationship with Beijing, Washington 
remains concerned about the long-term implications of China's rise and its 
intentions. 
In sum, while having profoundly changed America's relations with 
Asia, September 11 has not altered America's interests in the region: 
securing peace, maintaining an open economy, and advancement of free-
dom and rule of law. The exigency of the war calls for an emphasis on the 
congruence of interests above the congruence of values. In the long run, 
however, cultivating congenial values goes a long way to eradicate some 
distant sources of terrorism. To maintain the U.S. position in Strategic Asia 
for the long haul, Washington must pursue policies that combine values 
with interests. 
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22See Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002, http://www 
.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2003, http://www 
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